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      ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study was to assess whether paranormal beliefs 
were correlated with, or predicted by, emotional response to 
uncertainty, belief in science, reality testing, schizotypy, and 
rationality-experientiality. The research utilised an opportunity 
sample of  153 individuals, who completed six self-report 
measures. It was hypothesised that belief in science would have 
significant negative correlations with, and be a significant 
predictor of, paranormal beliefs. Also, that rationality and 
experientiality would be significant predictors of paranormal 
beliefs. Finally, it was hypothesised that uncertainty would have 
significant positive correlations with paranormal beliefs. Analysis 
included Pearson correlations, along with ‘enter’ and ‘stepwise’ 
methods of multiple regression. Results showed that paranormal 
beliefs exhibited significant positive correlations with 
uncertainty, reality testing, and schizotypy. While, they were 
found to possess significant negative correlations with belief in 
science and rationality. Regression analysis indicated that belief 
in science and reality testing were significant predictors of belief 
in the paranormal. The ‘stepwise’ method of regression showed 
that reality testing explained the largest amount of variance. 
These results are debated in relation to relevant literature. 
Limitations, implications, and future directions are also 
considered. 
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Introduction 
 
Even today, several individuals hold some form of paranormal belief; as many as 
73% of Americans as reported by the Gallup polls (Blackmore, 1997; Moore, 2005; 
Irwin, 2009). According to Irwin (2009), these are so widespread that they are 
present in all cultures to some extent. Yet, there is no consensus of what paranormal 
beliefs entail, as many of the commonly employed measures include diverse 
subscales (Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 2004). For example, the Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale includes witchcraft as an aspect of the paranormal, whereas 
the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale does not (Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 
2004;). For this study, paranormal beliefs will refer to acceptance of processes that 
are beyond current scientific understanding, including extrasensory perception, 
psychokinesis, religion, and witchcraft among other phenomena (Broad, 1949; 
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 2004). Despite their endorsement, there also 
exists no agreement regarding the reasons for their prevalence (Moore, 2005; 
Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Therefore, paranormal beliefs have been the emphasis of 
much psychological research, with considerable effort directed at exploring how 
other personality aspects may correlate with and/or predict them (Hergovich et al., 
2008). 
 
Many have theorised that paranormal beliefs may be influenced by an individual’s 
worldview (Irwin, 2009). For example, someone who interprets the world more 
objectively is likely to be sceptical of anything that they are unable to directly 
perceive (Irwin et al., 2016). As scientific belief is also associated with this objectivity, 
those who possess high belief in science may reject or be indifferent towards the 
paranormal due to its inability to be observed (Farias et al., 2013). The relationship 
between belief in science and the paranormal was explored by Irwin et al. (2016) in a 
sample of 202 participants, where it was discovered that belief in science did indeed 
negatively correlate with, and predict, paranormal beliefs. Similarly, Preston and 
Epley (2009) suggested that religiosity (a subscale of the paranormal in the 
Manchester Metropolitan University Paranormal Belief Scale) and science are 
conflicting; belief in one reduces an individual’s acceptance of the other (Drinkwater, 
2017). However, while some state this is because those with high belief in science 
simply possess more logic, Irwin et al. (2016) believes this to be an unfair 
assumption; a notion which appears to be wholly supported by further research 
(Legare et al., 2012). For example, many studies have suggested that people often 
simultaneously endorse both paranormal and scientific explanations, while others 
have been shown to unthinkingly accept science which undeniably requires some 
faith (Haught, 2005; Evans & Lane, 2011; Legare et al., 2012). Therefore, the 
relationship between scientific and paranormal beliefs may not be as simple as it 
originally appears, and thus demands additional consideration which this study will 
deliver (Legare et al., 2012; Irwin et al., 2016). 
 
Further, thinking style has been of keen interest regarding paranormal beliefs 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Specifically, whether an individual’s tendency to think 
more analytically (possessing rationality), or more intuitively (termed experientiality), 
relates to or predicts these beliefs (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Lindeman & Aarnio, 
2006). These systems are not inversely associated; rather, Epstein et al. (1996) 
proposed that they are independent, meaning it is possible for one to be high or low 
in both thinking styles. Research into the value of these in predicting paranormal 
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beliefs was conducted by Lindeman and Aarnio (2006). In their study, 3,261 
participants completed the Rationality-Experientiality Inventory (REI) to measure the 
two thinking styles mentioned, along with several measures of paranormal beliefs 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). The researchers discovered that 
low rational thinking and high experiential thinking were vital predictors of belief in 
paranormal processes, with experientiality being the most influential (Lindeman & 
Aarnio, 2006). These findings are notable for the present study as it possesses many 
parallels with Lindeman and Aarnio’s (2006) research in that it will also utilise the 
REI, in addition to having a sample consisting largely of university students, meaning 
similar conclusions may be anticipated. Then again, Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) 
state that their study was limited in that it was subjected to order effects, which could 
have impacted any findings. As the current research employs counter-balancing as 
recommended to ensure these are not an issue, this additional methodological 
stringency could give rise to contrasting findings than those presented (Lindeman & 
Aarnio, 2006).  
Another factor which has been of interest regarding paranormal beliefs is schizotypy, 
which Day & Peters (1999) describe as having experiences resembling positive 
schizophrenia symptoms (e.g. hallucinations) whilst continuing to be an active 
societal contributor (Andreasen et al., 1990). One piece of research exploring 
schizotypy and paranormal beliefs was by Hergovich et al. (2008) who, using 
questionnaires involving 571 adolescents, concluded that schizotypy may be a 
predictor of paranormal beliefs. However, this study involved adolescents whereas 
the present study does not, a pertinent point to highlight when it has been indicated 
that adolescents and adults may vary in their belief structure (Wolfradt & Straube, 
1998). Thus, additional research must be considered to gain an improved 
understanding of the area (Hergovich et al., 2008). A study investigating schizotypy 
and paranormal beliefs with a sample more aligned with the current research is by 
Dagnall et al. (2010), who found that schizotypy scores on the Schizotypy 
Personality Questionnaire-Brief (SPQ-B) were positively correlated with paranormal 
belief scores (Raine & Benishay, 1995). Drawing further parallels with Dagnall et al. 
(2010), the current study will also employ the SPQ-B, meaning these results, along 
with Hergovich et al.’s (2008) conclusions, provide a clearer outlook for potential 
findings (Raine & Benishay, 1995). Then again, Chequers et al. (1997) found no 
significant association between schizotypy and belief in extra-terrestrials, a subscale 
of paranormal beliefs, suggesting the relationship between these two factors could 
merit further consideration (Drinkwater, 2017). Regardless, Irwin (2009) states that 
the reason for reported positive correlations between schizotypy and paranormal 
beliefs is because schizotypy involves a reality testing deficit, meaning positive 
correlations between these factors may also be anticipated.  
 
Arlow (2018) describes reality testing as the extent to which someone can 
differentiate the internal (the self) from the external (object) world. Previously, some 
have theorised that deficits in reality testing may be vital in the development of 
paranormal beliefs (Irwin, 2003). If this is accurate, those who score high on 
paranormal belief measures may also score high on reality testing measures, in 
addition to reality testing deficits being a predictor (Irwin, 2003). This view was 
maintained by Drinkwater et al. (2012), who demonstrated that reality testing deficits 
correlated with increased paranormal beliefs in a sample of 136 participants. 
Similarly, more recent research by Dagnall et al. (2014) established this across three 
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robust, commonly employed measures of paranormal beliefs. Furthermore, in his 
replication study using 161 Australian adults, Irwin (2004) discovered reality testing 
to be a predictor of belief in the paranormal, which he considers support for his 
earlier assumption that the maintenance and formation of these beliefs may include 
some deficiency in reality testing. He maintains the reason for this is because 
individuals with these deficits immediately gravitate towards paranormal explanations 
for anomalous incidents, without thinking about how logical that attribution may be 
(Irwin, 2004). Therefore, Irwin (2004) also theorises that deficits in reality testing 
could be accompanied by more experiential thinking styles, which the present study 
will consider (Irwin, 2004). While, the discussed research does provide some 
direction for the current study, the area is an emerging one which therefore requires 
additional investigation (Irwin, 2003, 2004; Drinkwater et al., 2012). 
 
Contrasting with many of the factors discussed, the role of uncertainty in paranormal 
beliefs is relatively under researched (Hart et al., 2013). Of the existing literature, 
much of the focus is on intolerance to uncertainty as demonstrated by Hart et al. 
(2013), who found it to possess significant positive associations with belief in the 
paranormal. However, investigation into emotional response to uncertainty in relation 
to paranormal beliefs is all but absent, which the present study hopes to address 
(Greco & Roger, 2001). As a result of this omission in the literature, there exists little 
research which can provide this study with direction of what might be anticipated. 
Yet, it has been proposed that increases in belief in the paranormal during 
uncertainty may be due to the emotionality of the situation (Dudley, 2000). If this is 
indeed the case, then individuals with high emotional responses to uncertain 
circumstances may be more likely to accept the paranormal (Dudley, 2000). Further, 
as emotional response to uncertainty is defined by the experienced anxiety of being 
faced with ambiguity, Persinger’s (1985) suggestion that some paranormal beliefs 
could assist in reducing anxiety may explain any potential associations (Greco & 
Roger, 2001). For example, those with high emotional responses may use 
paranormal beliefs as a coping mechanism when faced with uncertainty, as these 
beliefs are thought to possess their most substantial influence when negative 
emotions are present (Persinger, 1985; Dudley, 2000). 
 
The aim of this study is to assess whether paranormal beliefs correlate with, or are 
predicted by, emotional response to uncertainty, belief in science, reality testing, 
schizotypy, and rationality-experientiality. Although relationships between several of 
these factors has been somewhat explored previously, the discussed research 
demonstrates the need for further investigation of many of them (Haught, 2005; 
Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Legare et al., 2012). This study is justified in that it will 
provide this, while considering the limitations presented (e.g. counter-balancing), in 
order to gain an improved understanding and add to the evidence base (Lindeman & 
Aarnio, 2006). Additionally, the unique exploration of a notable omission within the 
literature, the associations between paranormal beliefs and emotional response to 
uncertainty (henceforth referred to as uncertainty), provides further rationale for the 
present study (Greco & Roger, 2001). Thus, the hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Belief in science will have significant negative correlations with, and 
be a significant predictor of, paranormal beliefs. 
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Hypothesis 2: Rationality and experientiality will be significant predictors of 
paranormal beliefs. 
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty will have significant positive correlations with paranormal 
beliefs. 
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Method 
Design 
The study utilised a quantitative, non-experimental design of self-report 
questionnaires measuring seven variables: paranormal beliefs, uncertainty, belief in 
science, reality testing, schizotypy, rationality, and experientiality. Self-report 
measures were chosen due to their established practicality, and capacity to provide 
rich data sets (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). 
 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty-three individuals participated through opportunity sampling. 
This involved gathering respondents where available and was selected due to its 
convenience in gathering large numbers of participants (Fogelman, 2002). There 
were 109 female participants with a mean age of 23.55 (SD = 11.46) and range of 
18-88 years, in addition to 44 males with a mean age of 26.89 (SD = 15.04) and 
range of 18-89 years. Overall, participants had a mean age of 24.51 years (SD = 
12.64), with a range of 18-89 years. Respondents were required to be 18 years of 
age or above. 
The sample comprised of undergraduate students from Manchester Metropolitan 
University and other universities (83%), along with individuals from the general public 
(17%). Of the male participants, 70.5% were students while 29.5% were not, and 
88.1% of female respondents were students compared to 11.9% who were not. 
These were recruited from the SONA Participant Pool, MMU campus (e.g. cafés), 
and local gatherings. Participation was voluntary and could be terminated at any 
time. Respondents could also withdraw their results afterwards by quoting their 
unique identifier code to a researcher. 
 
Measures 
This study employed six self-report measures: the Manchester Metropolitan 
University Paranormal Belief Scale (MMUpbs; Drinkwater, 2017), Uncertainty 
Response-Emotional factor of the Uncertainty Response Scale (UR-E; Greco & 
Roger, 2001), Belief in Science Scale (BISS; Farias et al., 2013), reality testing 
subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organisation (IPO-RT; Lenzenweger et al., 
2001), Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire-Brief (SPQ-B; Raine & Benishay, 
1995), and the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Paranormal Beliefs: The MMUpbs was used to measure paranormal beliefs, which 
has demonstrated good internal reliability and validity (Drinkwater, 2017). This 50-
item questionnaire by Drinkwater (2017) assesses overall belief and eight subscales: 
hauntings, superstition, religion, extra-sensory perception (ESP), extra-
terrestrials/aliens, psychokinesis (PK), astrology, and witchcraft. Respondents rate 
statements (e.g. “ghosts do not exist”) on a 7-point Likert scale (1 being “strongly 
disagree” and 7 being “strongly agree”), with high scores indicating high belief 
(Drinkwater, 2017). The measure includes 12 negatively worded items (e.g. “it is not 
possible to communicate with the spirit world”) in order to limit response bias, which 
were reversed prior to analysis (Drinkwater, 2017). 
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Uncertainty: Emotional response to uncertainty was assessed by the UR-E factor of 
Greco and Roger’s (2001) 76-item Uncertainty Response Scale, which has 
demonstrated high internal and re-test reliability. This measure contains 15 items 
(e.g. “sudden changes make me feel upset”) rated on a 4-point Likert (1 being 
“never” and 4 being “always”), with high scores indicating a tendency to exhibit 
maladaptive responses to uncertainty (Greco & Roger, 2001). No items required 
reversing and there are no subscales (Greco & Roger, 2001). 
Belief in Science: This was calculated using the BISS, a 10-item scale with high 
internal reliability and validity (Farias et al., 2013; Irwin et al., 2015). Statements (e.g. 
“science is the most valuable part of human culture”) are rated on a 6-point Likert (1 
being “strongly disagree” and 6 being “strongly agree”), with high scores signifying 
high belief (Farias et al., 2013). Conventions dictate that there are no subscales and 
no items required reversing, with scores being an average over the 10 items (Farias 
et al., 2013). 
Reality Testing: Reality testing was measured by Lenzenweger et al.’s (2001) IPO-
RT, a subscale of the IPO that is intended to assess ‘capacity to differentiate self 
from non-self, intrapsychic from external stimuli, and to maintain empathy with 
ordinary social criteria of reality’ (Kernberg, 1996:120). This scale is comprised of 20 
statements (e.g. “I have seen things which do not exist in reality”) which are rated on 
a 5-point Likert (1 being “never true” and 5 being “always true”), with high scores 
representing potential deficits (Lenzenweger et al., 2001). The scale has displayed 
good retest reliability and construct validity, in addition to being internally reliable with 
non-clinical samples (Lenzenweger et al., 2001). Traditionally, this measure 
encompasses four subscales (delusional thinking, confusion, auditory and visual 
hallucinations, and social deficits); however, Dagnall et al. (2018) states that it 
should be utilised as a total scale, to which the current study adheres (Lenzenweger 
et al., 2001). 
Schizotypy: This was assessed using the SPQ-B, a 22-item scale containing 
statements (e.g. “I am an odd, unusual person”) and questions (e.g. “do you feel that 
you are unable to get "close" to people?”) which are rated dichotomously (“yes” or 
“no”) (Raine & Benishay, 1995). This measure is a brief version of the 74-item SPQ 
and possesses adequate internal reliability, with three subscales: interpersonal 
deficits, cognitive-perceptual deficits, and disorganisation (Raine, 1991; Raine & 
Benishay, 1995; Axelrod et al., 2001). However, Compton et al. (2007) advised 
utilisation of total scores as opposed to these subscales, which this research follows. 
No items required reversing, with high scores signifying potential schizotypal 
personality (Raine & Benishay, 1995). 
Rationality-Experientiality: Thinking styles were measured by the REI, a 
questionnaire encompassing 40 items which are rated on a 5-point Likert (1 being 
“completely false” and 5 being “completely true”) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This scale 
contains 19 negatively worded items, and two reliable, independent main scales: 
rationality and experientiality (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Further, these each have two 
reliable subscales: rational ability and rational engagement, and experiential ability 
and experiential engagement (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The rationality scale (e.g. “I 
have a logical mind”) assesses participation in analytical thinking, whereas 
experientiality (e.g. “I believe in trusting my hunches”) measures engagement in 
associative thought (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006).  
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Procedure 
To begin, ethical approval was granted through EthOS and an insurance checklist 
was completed. Following, respondents were invited to complete a questionnaire on 
paper, or online through Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2005). To eliminate order effects, 
researchers created six variations of the paper booklet, featuring the measures in 
different orders. For the online version, a randomiser was added to the survey flow. 
Initially, participants read an information sheet which described the study, before 
signing a consent form which asked their preferred gender, age in years, whether or 
not they were a student, and occupation. Succeeding this was the six randomised 
questionnaires. Participation ended with a debrief sheet, where respondents were 
thanked and provided with support details. Here, they were given the opportunity to 
create a unique identifier code and informed of their right to withdraw for up to four 
weeks, along with information on how to do so. No time limit existed for completion. 
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Results 
Reliability Analysis 
Cronbach’s alpha (α) within SPSS was utilised to assess the internal reliability of the 
six measures (Table 1). The MMUpbs (α = .96), UR-E (α = .93), BISS (α = .92), IPO-
RT (α = .92), and REI main scales of rationality (α = .90) and experientiality (α = .90) 
displayed excellent internal reliability. While, the SPQ-B (α = .88) demonstrated good 
internal reliability. No items were removed from any measure. Summary statistics for 
total measures are presented in Table 1. 
The internal reliability for subscales was also calculated (Table 2 and Table 3). The 
MMUpbs subscales of hauntings (α = .93), extra-terrestrials/aliens (α = .93), PK (α = 
.92), and witchcraft (α = .91) exhibited excellent internal reliability, while religion (α = 
.89), ESP (α = .81), and astrology (α = .83) had good internal reliability, and 
superstition (α = .79) demonstrated adequate internal reliability. REI subscales of 
rational ability (α = .82), rational engagement (α = .85), experiential ability (α = .84), 
and experiential engagement (α = .82) showed good internal reliability.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Relationships between main scales were examined using Pearson correlations 
(Table 1). Corresponding with Drinkwater et al. (2012), this study utilised r as an 
indicator of effect size, with .50 signifying a large effect, .30 a medium effect, and .10 
indicating a small effect.  
 
Table 1  
Correlations and Summary Statistics for Paranormal Beliefs (MMUpbs), 
Uncertainty (UR-E), Belief in Science (BISS), Reality Testing (IPO-RT), 
Schizotypy (SPQ-B), and Rationality-Experientiality (REI)  
 
Note: ** Significant at .01 level (p < .01; 1-tailed)                                                                        
 * Significant at .05 level (p < .05; 1-tailed)              
  N = 153 
 
Paranormal beliefs were found to have significant positive correlations with 
uncertainty, r(151) = .27, p < .001; reality testing, r(151) = .52, p < .001; schizotypy, 
r(151) = .27, p < .001; and experientiality, r(151) = .26, p = .001. While, significant 
negative relationships were discovered with belief in science, r(151) = -.36, p < .001; 
and rationality, r(151) = -.21, p = .011. 
Page 11 of 21 
 
 
Uncertainty possessed significant positive associations with reality testing, r(151) = 
.36, p < .001; schizotypy, r(151) = .34, p < .001; and experientiality, r(151) = .22, p = 
.006. Uncertainty did not significantly correlate with belief in science or rationality. 
It was discovered that belief in science had significant a positive relationship with 
rationality, r(151) = .18, p = .027. However, it had significant negative correlations 
with schizotypy, r(151) = -.22, p = .007. No significant correlation existed between 
belief in science and reality testing, or it and experientiality. 
Further, reality testing had significant positive correlations with schizotypy, r(151) = 
.52, p < .001; and experientiality, r(151) = .22, p = .007. Reality testing showed no 
significant associations with rationality. 
Schizotypy did not significantly correlate with rationality or experientiality. 
Further analysis was conducted to explore correlations between MMUpbs subscales 
and other total measures (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for MMUpbs subscales and Correlations with other main 
scales 
 
Note: ** Significant at .01 level (p < .01; 1-tailed)      
 * Significant at .05 level (p < .05; 1-tailed)    
 REI-R = REI-Rationality; REI-E = REI-Experientiality    
 N = 153 
 
Hauntings demonstrated significant positive correlations with uncertainty, r(151) = 
.24, p = .002; reality testing, r(151) = .45, p < .001; schizotypy, r(151) = .26, p = .001; 
and experientiality, r(151) = .21, p = .004. Hauntings had significant negative 
relationships with belief in science, r(151) = -.24, p = .002. It had no significant 
correlation with rationality. 
Extra-terrestrials/aliens had significant positive relationships with uncertainty, r(151) 
= .16, p = .021; reality testing, r(151) = .34, p < .001; and schizotypy, r(151) = .19, p 
= .010. However, it had no significant correlations with belief in science, rationality, or 
experientiality. 
Moreover, PK demonstrated significant positive associations with uncertainty, r(151) 
= .19, p = .010; reality testing, r(151) = .47, p < .001; and schizotypy, r(151) = .15, p 
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= .034. It displayed significant negative correlations with belief in science, r(151) = -
.22, p = .003; and rationality, r(151) = -.19, p = .010. No significant relationship 
existed between PK and experientiality. 
Witchcraft demonstrated significant positive associations with uncertainty, r(151) = 
.24, p = .001; reality testing, r(151) = .39, p < .001; and schizotypy, r(151) = .20, p = 
.006. It possessed significant negative correlations with belief in science, r(151) = -
.40, p < .001. No significant correlation was found with rationality or experientiality.  
Religion had significant positive relationships with reality testing, r(151) = .34, p < 
.001; schizotypy, r(151) = .21, p = .004; and experientiality, r(151) = .17, p = .019. 
However, it showed significant negative correlations with belief in science, r(151) = -
.55, p < .001. No association was found with uncertainty or rationality. 
ESP possessed significant positive correlations with uncertainty, r(151) = .30, p < 
.001; reality testing, r(151) = .45, p < .001; schizotypy, r(151) = .30, p < .001; and 
experientiality, r(151) = .43, p < .001. However, it showed significant negative 
relationships with belief in science, r(151) = -.30, p < .001; and rationality, r(151) = -
.16, p = .026. 
Likewise, Astrology demonstrated significant positive associations with uncertainty, 
r(151) = .16, p = .024; reality testing, r(151) = .38, p < .001; schizotypy, r(151) = .22, 
p = .003; and experientiality, r(151) = .23, p = .002. It had significant negative 
correlations with belief in science, r(151) = -.36, p < .001; and rationality, r(151) = -
.33, p < .001. 
Superstition displayed significant positive correlations with uncertainty, r(151) = .27, 
p < .001; reality testing, r(151) = .22, p = 003; and experientiality, r(151) = .24, p = 
.001. Significant negative correlations were exhibited between superstition and 
rationality, r(151) = -.20, p = .006. No significant associations were found with belief 
in science or schizotypy. 
 
Table 3 
Summary Statistics for REI subscales and Correlations with other main scales 
 
Note: ** Significant at .01 level (p < .01; 1-tailed)      
 * Significant at .05 level (p < .05; 1-tailed)     
 N = 153 
 
Regarding REI subscales (Table 3), rational ability had significant positive 
correlations with belief in science, r(151) = .23, p = .003; and significant negative 
associations with paranormal beliefs. r(151) = -.25, p = .001; uncertainty, r(151) = -
.16, p = .022; and reality testing, r(151) = -.15, p = .030. No significant relationship 
was found with schizotypy. 
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Rational engagement had significant negative correlations with paranormal beliefs, 
r(151) = -.14, p = .046. It possessed no significant relationships with uncertainty, 
belief in science, reality testing, or schizotypy. 
Experiential ability demonstrated significant positive relationships with paranormal 
beliefs, r(151) = .23, p = .002; uncertainty, r(151) = .21, p = .005; and reality testing, 
r(151) = .15, p = .029; But, it showed no significant correlations with belief in science 
or schizotypy. 
Experiential engagement displayed significant positive associations with paranormal 
beliefs, r(151) = .25, p = .001; uncertainty, r(151) = .20, p = .007; reality testing, 
r(151) = .25, p = .001; and schizotypy, r(151) = .19, p = .010. However, there was no 
significant correlation with belief in science. 
Pearson correlations were also conducted to discover relationships between 
subscales of the MMUpbs and REI (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
Correlations between subscales of MMUpbs and subscales of REI 
 
Note: ** Significant at .01 level (p < .01; 1-tailed)      
 * Significant at .05 level (p < .05; 1-tailed).     
 N = 153 
 
Hauntings had significant positive correlations with experiential engagement, r(151) 
= .21, p = .004; and experiential ability, r(151) = .18, p = .015. It demonstrated 
significant negative relationships with rational ability, r(151) = -.18, p = .015. 
Hauntings did not significantly associate with rational engagement. 
Extra-terrestrials/aliens had significant negative correlations with rational ability, 
r(151) = -.16, p = .022. It had no significant associations with rational engagement, 
experiential ability, or experiential engagement. 
PK demonstrated significant negative correlations with rational ability, r(151) = -.22, p 
= .004; and rational engagement, r(151) = -.13, p = .049. However, it did not 
significantly relate with experiential ability or experiential engagement. 
Witchcraft showed significant positive associations with experiential ability, r(151) = 
.15, p = .036; and significant negative correlations with rational ability, r(151) = -.19, 
p = .009. No significant relationship was found with rational engagement or 
experiential engagement. 
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Religion showed significant positive correlations with experiential ability, r(151) = .16, 
p = .023; and experiential engagement, r(151) = .15, p = .035. Though, it 
demonstrated no significant associations with rational ability and rational 
engagement. 
ESP displayed significant positive associations with experiential ability, r(151) = .39, 
p < .001; and experiential engagement, r(151) = .40, p < .001. Whereas, it 
possessed significant negative relationships with rational ability, r(151) = -.20, p = 
.007. But, it showed no significant association with rational engagement. 
Astrology had significant positive correlations with experiential ability, r(151) = .19, p 
= .009; and experiential engagement, r(151) = .23, p = .002. While, it had significant 
negative relationships with rational ability, r(151) = -.35, p < .001; and rational 
engagement, r(151) = -.27, p < .001. 
Finally, superstition too had significant positive correlations with experiential ability, 
r(151) = .19, p = .008; and experiential engagement, r(151) = .26, p = .001. Similarly, 
it demonstrated significant negative relationships with rational ability, r(151) = -.18, p 
= .012; and rational engagement, r(151) = -.19, p = .010. 
 
Regression Analysis  
Before conducting multiple regression, assumptions were tested to confirm that this 
was a valid method of analysis. Standardised residuals indicated no outliers (Std. 
Residual Min = -3.26, Std. Residual Max = 2.20). Tests to ensure data met 
collinearity assumptions showed that multicollinearity was not a concern (uncertainty, 
Tolerance = .78, VIF = 1.28; belief in science, Tolerance = .89, VIF = 1.12; reality 
testing, Tolerance = .67, VIF = 1.49; schizotypy, Tolerance = .67, VIF = 1.49; 
rationality, Tolerance = .93, VIF = 1.08; experientiality, Tolerance = .91, VIF = 1.10). 
Data also met assumptions of independent errors (Durbin-Watson value = 1.89), and 
non-zero variances (paranormal beliefs, Variance = 2779.61; uncertainty, Variance = 
87.48; belief in science, Variance = 1.26; reality testing, Variance = 194.78; 
schizotypy, Variance = 29.89; rationality, Variance = 149.11; experientiality, Variance 
= 141.30). The histogram, normal P-P plot, and scatterplot of standardised residuals 
demonstrate that the data satisfied assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity. 
 
Table 5 
Summary of regression analysis for factors predicting Paranormal Beliefs 
(MMUpbs) 
 
Note: N = 153 
Page 15 of 21 
 
 
Using the ‘enter’ method (Table 5), a significant model arose (F(6, 146) = 15.54, p < 
.001). The relationship between variables was strong (R = .62), and the model 
explained 39.0% (R2adj = 36.5%) of the variance in paranormal belief scores. Of the 
six factors, reality testing was the strongest predictor of paranormal beliefs, β = .44, 
t(146) = 5.64, p < .001; while belief in science was a significant negative predictor, β 
= -.28, t(146) = -4.07, p < .001. However, paranormal beliefs were not predicted by 
uncertainty, β = .10, t(146) = 1.30, p = .196; schizotypy, β = -.07, t(146) = -.92, p = 
.359; rationality, β = -.11, t(146) = -1.57, p = .120; or experientiality, β = .12, t(146) = 
1.74, p = .085. 
 
Table 6 
Model summary of stepwise method for factors predicting Paranormal Beliefs 
(MMUpbs)  
 
Note: N = 153 
 
Further, the ‘stepwise’ method was utilised (Table 6). This enters predictor variables 
one by one, ordered by the strength of their relationship to paranormal beliefs, to 
discover additive impact (Drinkwater et al., 2012).  
The first model that emerged was significant (F(1, 151) = 55.34, p < .001). This 
model (R = .52) explained 26.8% (R2adj = 26.3%) of the variance, and included only 
reality testing, β = .52, t(151) = 7.44, p < .001.  
The second model was also significant (F(2, 150) = 40.65, p < .001). This model (R = 
.59) accounted for 35.1% (R2adj = 34.3%) of the variance, which also included reality 
testing, β = .47, t(150) = 7.12, p < .001; along with belief in science, β = -.29, t(150) = 
-4.39, p < .001.  
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Discussion 
The current study found that belief in science had significant negative correlations 
with, and was a significant predictor of, paranormal beliefs. Thus, hypothesis 1 was 
accepted. These results are in parallel with Irwin et al. (2016), who concluded 
similarly regarding these two factors. Further, the significant negative relationship 
between scientific belief and the MMUpbs subscale of religion provides support for 
Preston and Epley’s (2009) notion that these two factors are inversely related 
(Drinkwater, 2017). As the findings demonstrate that those who view the world in a 
more objective sense (having high belief in science) are indeed sceptical to accept 
the paranormal, it suggests that there could be merit to Irwin’s (2009) claim that 
these beliefs could be impacted by individuals’ worldview (Irwin et al., 2016). 
Importantly, this is furthered when examining the correlations between scientific 
belief and the subscales of the MMUpbs (Drinkwater, 2017). For example, belief in 
science displayed significant negative associations with every subscale apart from 
extra-terrestrials/aliens and superstition, where no correlation was present, indicating 
there could be accuracy in that these people reject or are indifferent towards 
anything they cannot directly observe (Irwin, 2009; Irwin et al., 2016). Meanwhile, 
these subscale correlations also appear to contradict Legare et al. (2012) and Evans 
and Lane’s (2011) suggestion of a supposed simultaneous endorsement of scientific 
and paranormal explanations. Furthermore, while Irwin et al. (2016) proposed it may 
be unjust to assume that those with high belief in science are more logical, there are 
indications that these individuals often possess more rational thinking styles as 
demonstrated through the significant positive correlations found between the two. 
Continuing with thinking styles, it was found that paranormal beliefs displayed 
significant positive correlations with experientiality, while having significant negative 
associations with rationality. This supports the idea that whether individuals think 
more analytically, or more intuitively, may relate to their tendency to believe in the 
paranormal (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Regarding thinking styles as predictors, 
neither rationality or experientiality were found to be significant predictors of 
paranormal beliefs in the current study, meaning hypothesis 2 was rejected. 
Evidently, this appears to contrast with Lindeman and Aarnio (2006), who concluded 
that low rationality and high experientiality were crucial predictors of paranormal 
belief. As both the present research and Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) employed the 
REI to assess thinking styles, along with a sample consisting mainly of university 
students, it seems unlikely that this disparity could be due to the use of this measure 
or samples utilised (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Rather, this 
study’s implementation of counter-balancing may have been a factor since, as 
acknowledged, this methodological rigour was lacking in Lindeman & Aarnio’s (2006) 
research and may have led to order effects. Therefore, some may state that this 
research potentially presents a more valid exploration of these two factors; however, 
future study should investigate thinking style and paranormal beliefs further. 
Examination of schizotypy demonstrated that it did not significantly predict 
paranormal beliefs, yet a significant positive relationship existed between the two. 
On the one hand, the latter parallels the findings of Dagnall et al. (2010) who 
discovered likewise, while the former directly refutes Hergovich et al.’s (2008) 
conclusions that schizotypy is a significant predictor of belief in the paranormal. The 
reasons for this could be due to the shared methodology between the current 
research and Dagnall et al. (2010), in that both utilised the SPQ-B in a sample of 
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predominantly psychology students from MMU. Whereas, differences in sample may 
explain the contrasting findings between this research and Hergovich et al. (2008), 
who’s respondents were adolescents recruited from Austrian schools. For example, 
the cultures involved in both studies may have dissimilarities which bring about these 
opposing results. Alternatively, it could be that there is accuracy in Wolfradt and 
Straube’s (1998) theory that adolescents and adults have varied factor structures 
underlying their beliefs, such as those in the paranormal. Further, when exploring the 
subscales of paranormal belief, the findings contradicted those of Chequers et al. 
(1997) as schizotypy displayed significant positive associations with extra-
terrestrials/aliens. However, measures of extra-terrestrial belief may have been a 
factor in this discrepancy as Chequers et al.’s (1997) devised questions for specific 
use within their study, whereas the current research employed the MMUpbs which 
has demonstrated repeated reliability (Drinkwater, 2017). The results of the current 
study indeed provide additional evidence for the claim that schizotypy involves a 
deficit of reality testing because, as expected, these two factors displayed a 
significant positive relationship (Irwin, 2009).  
Corresponding with findings by Drinkwater et al. (2012) and Dagnall et al. (2014), the 
results showed a significant positive correlation between reality testing deficits and 
paranormal beliefs. While, Dagnall et al. (2014) demonstrated this using three 
measures of paranormal beliefs, this study adds to the increasingly prevalent 
relationship between the two factors by establishing it with a more recent measure in 
the MMUpbs (Drinkwater, 2017). Analysing these factors further demonstrated that 
reality testing deficits also had significant positive correlations with every subscale of 
the MMUpbs, which was not the case with any other main scale, providing 
supplementary evidence for the strong relationship (Drinkwater, 2017). Moreover, 
the regression analysis illustrates that reality testing was the strongest predictor of 
paranormal beliefs which, consistent with Irwin’s (2004) study, suggests that there 
could be accuracy in the idea that these people tend to accept paranormal 
explanations for anomalous events without considering the logic. This notion may 
also explain the positive associations found between reality testing deficits and 
experiential thinking styles, as the paranormal attributions that these people make 
may be influenced by the reliance on intuition which characterises experientiality, 
supporting Irwin’s (2004) theory regarding the two factors (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Further, exploration of experientiality subscales demonstrates that experiential 
engagement, or the enjoyment of relying on feelings in decision making, had the 
largest effect on reality testing; a result which should be investigated in more detail in 
future research (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) 
As previously established, a large proportion of the limited research into uncertainty 
and paranormal beliefs has concerned intolerance to uncertainty (Hart et al., 2013). 
Regarding the current study’s novel exploration of emotional response to uncertainty, 
it was discovered it was not a predictor of paranormal beliefs, but a significant 
positive relationship existed between it and belief in the paranormal. Accordingly, 
hypothesis 3 was accepted. In support of Dudley’s (2000) theory, these results could 
indicate that the level of paranormal beliefs held by individuals may indeed be 
influenced by the magnitude of unpleasant emotion experienced in response to 
ambiguity. In the context of Hart et al. (2013), this could suggest that emotionality of 
uncertainty may have mediated the relationship found in their study (Dudley, 2000). 
Consistent with Persinger’s (1985) explanation, it may be that participants in the 
present study adopted paranormal explanations as a method of coping with a lack of 
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definitiveness, due to the recognised capacity of these beliefs in reducing the 
associated anxiety. However, this notion is called into question somewhat when 
observing the correlations between emotional response to uncertainty and the 
MMUpbs subscale of religion as, despite religious coping being well-established in 
literature, no significant relationship was apparent (Persinger, 1985; Ano & 
Vasconcelles, 2005). Though, importantly, these are initial exploratory findings in an 
area where understanding was undoubtedly lacking previously, and so very little can 
be inferred without further investigation. Nevertheless, the current research 
represents a valuable starting point. 
 
While, this study addressed limitations of previous research, such as a lack of 
counter-balancing, it is not without its own (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). As with much 
of the research mentioned, the sample was predominantly one consisting of female 
university students (Drinkwater, 2012; Dagnall et al., 2014; Irwin et al., 2015). While 
this is not a problem as such, the researchers acknowledge that it may restrict the 
generalisability of the findings. To investigate the factors in the current study further, 
future research would be advised to gather respondents from more varied 
populations, in order to represent a broader range of ages in hopes of discovering 
results that are more widely applicable. Furthermore, Irwin (2004) suggests that self-
report questionnaires can be a limitation in research. Alternatively, he suggests 
measures of performance, which subsequent investigations may decide to 
incorporate where appropriate (Irwin, 2004). Continuing with the measures, the 
current research utilised a brief version of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
to ensure the questionnaire booklet was manageable (Raine & Benishay, 1995). 
However, if desired, researchers could employ the full 74-item scale to examine 
whether this yields findings that correspond with, or contrast, the results presented 
(Raine, 1991).  
 
In sum, paranormal beliefs exhibited significant positive correlations with emotional 
response to uncertainty, reality testing, and schizotypy. While, paranormal beliefs 
were found to possess significant negative associations with belief in science and 
rationality. Both belief in science and reality testing were significant predictors of 
belief in the paranormal. The implications of this study are that it adds to the 
evidence base regarding paranormal beliefs and its correlates/predictors, in turn 
increasing our understanding of why individuals may believe in the associated 
phenomena. To expand on this, a hierarchical cluster analysis could be performed 
on data assessing similar factors, with the aim to identify in what way participants 
group together in their beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 19 of 21 
 
 
References 
Andreasen, N. C., Flaum, M., Swayze, V. W., Tyrrell, G. and Arndt, S. (1990) 
‘Positive and Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia: A Critical Reappraisal.’ Archives 
of General Psychiatry, 47(7) pp. 615-621. 
Ano, G. G. and Vasconcelles, E. B. (2005) ‘Religious Coping and Psychological 
Adjustment to Stress: A Meta-Analysis.’ Journal of Clinical Psychology, 61(4) pp. 
461-480. 
Arlow, J. A. (2018) ‘Fantasy, Memory, and Reality Testing.’ The Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly, 87(1) pp. 127-148. 
Axelrod, S. R., Grilo, C. M., Sanislow, C. and McGlashan, T. H. (2001) ‘Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire-Brief: Factor Structure and Convergent Validity in 
Inpatient Adolescents.’ Journal of Personality Disorders, 15(2) pp. 168-179. 
Blackmore, S. J. (1997) ‘Probability misjudgement and belief in the paranormal: A 
newspaper survey.’ British Journal of Psychology, 88(4) pp. 683-689. 
Broad, C. (1949) ‘The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy.’ Philosophy, 
24(91) pp. 291-309. 
Chequers, J., Joseph, S. and Diduca, D. (1997) ‘Belief in extraterrestrial life, UFO-
related beliefs, and schizotypal personality.’ Personality and Individual Differences, 
23(3) pp. 519-521. 
Compton, M. T., Chien, V. H. and Bollini, A. M. (2007) ‘Psychometric properties of 
the Brief Version of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire in relatives of patients 
with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and non-psychiatric controls’ Schizophrenia 
Research, 91(1-3) pp. 122-131. 
Dagnall, N., Denovan, A., Parker, A., Drinkwater, K. and Walsh, R. S. (2018) 
‘Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Inventory of Personality Organization-Reality 
Testing Subscale.’ Frontiers in Psychology, 9:1116. [Online] [Accessed on 17th 
March 2019] DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01116. 
Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A. and Rowley, K. (2014) ‘Misperception of 
Chance, Conjunction, Belief in the Paranormal and Reality Testing: A Reappraisal.’ 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28(5) pp. 711-719. 
Dagnall, N., Munley, G., Parker, A. and Drinkwater, K. (2010) ‘Paranormal belief, 
schizotypy, and transliminality.’ Journal of Parapsychology, 74(1) pp. 117-141. 
Day, S. & Peters, E. (1999) ‘The incidence of schizotypy in new religious 
movements.’ Personality and Individual Differences, 27(1) pp. 55-67. 
Drinkwater, K. G. (2017) Belief in the Paranormal: Measurement Development and 
Evaluation. Ph.D. Manchester Metropolitan University. 
Drinkwater, K., Dagnall, N. and Parker, A. (2012) ‘Reality testing, conspiracy 
theories, and paranormal beliefs.’ Journal of Parapsychology, 76(1) pp. 57-77. 
Dudley, R. T. (2000) ‘The relationship between negative affect and paranormal 
belief.’ Personality and Individual Differences, 28(2) pp. 315-321. 
Page 20 of 21 
 
 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V. and Heier, H. (1996) ‘Individual differences in 
intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles.’ Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 71(2) pp. 390-405. 
Evans, E. M. and Lane, J. D. (2011) ‘Contradictory or Complementary? Creationist 
and Evolutionist Explanations of the Origin(s) of Species.’ Human Development, 
54(3) pp. 144-159. 
Farias, M., Newheiser, A., Kahane, G. and Toledo, Z. (2013) ‘Scientific faith: Belief in 
science increases in the face of stress and existential anxiety.’ Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 49(6) pp. 1210-1213. 
Fogelman, K. (2002) ‘Surveys and sampling.’ In Coleman, M. and Briggs, A. R. J. 
(eds.) Research Methods in Educational Leadership and Management. London: 
Sage Publications, pp. 93-107. 
Greco, V. & Roger, D. (2001) ‘Coping with uncertainty: The construction and 
validation of a new measure.’ Personality and Individual Differences, 31(4) pp. 519-
534. 
Hart, J. W., Sullivan-Sanchez, C. Packer, T. and Loveless, J. (2013) ‘Is Any 
Explanation Better Than No Explanation? Intolerance of Uncertainty and Paranormal 
Beliefs.’ Social Behaviour and Personality, 41(2) pp. 343-344. 
Haught, J. F. (2005) ‘Science and Scientism: The Importance of a Distinction.’ 
Zygon, 40(2) pp. 363-368. 
Hergovich, A., Schott, R. and Arendasy, M. (2008) ‘On the relationship between 
paranormal belief and schizotypy among adolescents.’ Personality and Individual 
Differences, 45(2) pp. 119-125. 
Irwin, H. J. (2003) ‘Reality Testing and the Formation of Paranormal Beliefs.’ 
European Journal of Parapsychology, 18(1) pp. 15-28. 
Irwin, H. J. (2004) ‘Reality testing and the formation of paranormal beliefs: A 
constructive replication.’ Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 68(3) pp. 
143-152. 
Irwin, H. J. (2009) The Psychology of Paranormal Belief: A Researcher's Handbook. 
Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press. 
Irwin, H. J., Dagnall, N., and Drinkwater, K. (2015) ‘The role of doublethink and other 
coping processes in paranormal and related beliefs.’ Journal of the Society for 
Psychical Research, 79(919) pp. 80-97. 
Irwin, H. J., Dagnall, N. and Drinkwater, K. (2016) ‘Dispositional Scepticism, 
Attitudes to Science, and Belief in the Paranormal.’ Australian Journal of 
Parapsychology, 16(2) pp. 117-131. 
Kernberg, O. F. (1996) ‘A psychoanalytic theory of personality disorders.’ In Clarkin, 
J. F. and Lenzenweger, M. F. (eds.) Major Theories of Personality Disorder. New 
York: Guilford Press, pp. 106-140. 
Legare, C. H., Evans, E. M., Rosengren, K. S. and Harris, P. L. (2012) ‘The 
coexistence of natural and supernatural explanations across cultures and 
development.’ Child Development, 83(3) pp. 779-793. 
Page 21 of 21 
 
 
Lenzenweger, M. F., Clarkin, J. F., Kernberg, O. F. and Foelsch, P. (2001) ‘The 
Inventory of Personality Organization: Psychometric properties, factorial 
composition, and criterion relations with affect, aggressive dyscontrol, psychosis 
proneness, and self-domains in a nonclinical sample.’ Psychological Assessment, 
13(4) pp. 577-591. 
Lindeman, M. and Aarnio, K. (2006) ‘Paranormal Beliefs: Their Dimensionality and 
Correlates.’ European Journal of Personality, 20(7) pp. 585-602. 
Moore, D. W. (2005) Three in Four Americans Believe in Paranormal. 16th June. 
Gallup News Service. [Online] [Accessed on 23rd January 2019] 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/16915/three-four-americans-believe-paranormal.aspx 
Pacini, R. & Epstein, S. (1999) ‘The Relation of Rational and Experiential Information 
Processing Styles to Personality, Basic Beliefs, and the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon.’ 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(6) pp. 972-987. 
Paulhus, D. L. and Vazire, S. (2007) ‘The Self-Report Method.’ In Robins, R. W., 
Fraley, R. C. and Krueger, R. F. (eds.) Handbook of research methods in personality 
psychology. New York: Guildford Press, pp. 224-239.  
Persinger, M. A. (1985) ‘Death anxiety as a semantic conditioned suppression 
paradigm.’ Perceptual and Motor Skills, 60(3) pp. 827-830. 
Preston, J. and Epley, N. (2006) ‘Science and God: An automatic opposition 
between ultimate explanations.’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4) 
pp. 238-241. 
Qualtrics. (2005) Qualtrics. Version November 2018. [Software] Provo: Qualtrics. 
[Accessed on 17th November 2018] 
Raine, A. (1991) ‘The SPQ: a scale for the assessment of schizotypal personality 
based on DSM-III-R criteria.’ Schizophrenia Bulletin, 17(4) pp. 555-564. 
Raine, A. & Benishay, D. (1995) ‘The SPQ-B: A Brief Screening Instrument for 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder.’ Journal of Personality Disorders, 9(4) pp. 346-355. 
Thalbourne, M. A. and Delin, P. S. (1993) ‘A new instrument for measuring the 
sheep-goat variable: its psychometric properties and factor structure.’ Journal of the 
Society for Psychical Research, 59(832) pp. 172-186. 
Tobacyk, J. (2004) ‘A revised paranormal belief scale.’ International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, 23(1) pp. 94-98. 
Tobacyk, J. & Milford, G. (1983) ‘Belief in paranormal phenomena: assessment 
instrument development and implications for personality functioning.’ Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 44(5) pp.1029-1037. 
Wolfradt, U. and Straube, E. R. (1998) ‘Factor structure of schizotypal traits among 
adolescents.’ Personality and Individual Differences, 24(2) pp. 201-206. 
 
 
